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Sentiment-prone investors and volatility dynamics between spot and futures 
markets 
 
1. -Introduction 
The introduction of futures markets brought about a significant improvement in the 
news transmission mechanism by allowing more rapid adjustment of prices to new 
information (Antoniou et al, 1998) and may have expanded cross-market information 
flows by attracting new traders (Cox, 1976).  This may well determine the way 
information is incorporated into both spot and futures prices. The extent of the impact 
will depend upon the types of traders active in the two markets (Antoniou et al, 1998). 
Circumstances affecting the investor mix in the spot or the futures market, liquidity-
driven changes in the transaction costs on asset trading, or both of these in conjunction 
could alter information flow dynamics between spot and futures markets1. A potentially 
key variable in this issue is investor sentiment. Noise traders tend to be more active in 
bullish than in bearish markets (Baker and Stein, 2004) and to have less capacity to 
react to news, since their overconfidence and self-attribution biases, which increase in 
the presence of high market sentiment. Yu and Yuan (2011) also argue that sentiment-
driven investors participate and trade more aggressively in high-sentiment periods, due 
to their reluctance to take short positions in low-sentiment periods. Behavioural finance 
has shown that, when investor sentiment is high, arbitrage activity by informed traders 
slows due to noise trading risk, that is, risk arising from the unpredictability of noise 
traders’ behaviour.  In periods such as these, informed investors will stay out of the 
market (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). Sophisticated traders, aware of the overpricing that 
accompanies moments of high market sentiment, may also significantly reduce their 
exposure at such times, thereby allowing the influence of noise trader behaviour in price 
setting to increase. This difference in trading behaviour can affect trading volume, 
investor mix and effective transaction costs in both these markets.  
This framework raises the interest in examining the impact of the level of investor 
sentiment on the contemporaneous dynamics of the spot and futures markets, and on 
volatility spillovers between both markets. This, as far as we know, is the first attempt 
to explore this issue. The focus of the study is to analyse the joint dynamics of several 
stock indexes and their respective futures contracts, specifically, the S&P500 index for 
                                               
1The literature has in fact shown that regulatory reform or changes in the overall economic environment have had 
considerable impact on these dynamics. See, for example, the effect of variation in the transaction costs of futures markets 
(Aragó et al, 2003) or the changing nature of volatility contagion between financial markets (Saha and Chakrabati, 2011).  
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the US market, and the CAC40, the DAX30, the IBEX35, the FTSE100, and the 
Eurostoxx50 for the European market.  
This study makes several contributions to the literature. Firstly, it focuses on the 
effect of investor sentiment on trading volume in the spot and futures markets. During 
periods of high market sentiment, while noise traders become more active, informed 
traders try to reduce their exposure, so the net effect becomes an empirical issue. This 
analysis enables us to test the “create space” effect (De Long et al, 1990), which is 
described in more detail in the theoretical framework section.   
Secondly, in connection with the above, this paper focuses on whether the efficiency of 
response and information flow between spot and futures markets is altered when a 
period of high market sentiment results in a massive influx of noise traders upsetting 
the existing investor mix in both markets. If such an alteration occurs, correlation 
between the two markets will be affected and informational efficiency reduced as a 
consequence.  This issue will be explored using bivariate GJR (Glosten-Jagannathan-
Runkle, 1993) models to examine the time-varying correlation between financial markets 
in the light of investor sentiment.  
Informational efficiency can also be affected by the amount of information flow 
between markets. The third contribution of this paper is to investigate the issue along 
these lines. The extent of the potential effect of investor sentiment on spillovers between 
the two markets is observed by analysing the impact of own-market or other-market 
news on volatility and the extent of the asymmetric volatility effect brought about by 
good or bad news from either market. Behavioural finance theory indicates that in 
periods of high market sentiment order flows are less informative, because the strong 
presence of noise traders impedes a rational market response to the news. Thus, in line 
with the “noise trading” hypothesis, we can expect information shocks to have less 
impact and information efficiency to diminish. 
Finally, the paper presents some of the practical implications stemming from the 
findings. As well as for academics, this study holds interest for practitioners, because 
knowledge and understanding of the variables influencing the degree of integration 
between the two markets and the mechanisms by which news is incorporated into spot 
and futures prices and transmitted across markets are important when considering 
trading or hedge positions. Thus, the discussion section briefly describes two applications 
which demonstrate the effects deriving from changes in correlation and information flow 
between spot and futures markets due to changes in investor sentiment. In the first 
application we analyse the effectiveness of dynamic hedging when correlation between 
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the two markets is estimated with, versus without, investor sentiment. In the second, we 
test whether the level of investor sentiment has a significant impact on the level of 
mispricing in futures contracts.  
The rest of this article comprises five more sections. Section 2 discusses the 
theoretical framework for the analysis and the formulation of the hypotheses to be 
tested. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the empirical model and the 
results. Section 5 discusses two applications of the results obtained in the previous 
section and section 6 summarises the main conclusions. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework and Testable Hypotheses 
The behavioural finance literature suggests that investor sentiment, defined as 
investors’ opinions regarding future cash flows and investment risk (Chang et al, 2012), 
affects trading decisions. The influence of investors’ future expectations may result in 
mispricing that will affect pricing models. Recognition of noise traders and their 
responses to investor sentiment completes the classic asset pricing theory. Indeed, Yang 
and Li (2013) or Yang and Cai (2014) among others have recently incorporated investor 
sentiment into the asset pricing model, by adjusting the economic valuation model to the 
reality of the asset market. 
De Long et al (1990) present a simple overlapping-generations model of an asset 
market in which irrational noise traders with erroneous stochastic beliefs affect prices 
and earn higher expected returns. The model presents two possible effects: the transitory 
effect and the permanent effect. The former captures the influence of noise trading on 
excess returns due to contemporaneous changes in sentiment (“price-pressure” and 
“hold-more” effects). The latter is related to variations in market sentiment due to noise 
trading (the “Friedman” and “create- space” effects) and their impact on return volatility. 
The net effect will depend on the relative weight of the individual effects (Lee et al, 
2002).  
The main effect in the model, and the one of most interest for our study, is the “create 
space” effect, which is based on the notion that, in order to benefit from noise traders’ 
misperceptions, sophisticated investors must bear this greater risk. Being risk averse, 
sophisticated investors reduce their exposure as market risk increases with a stronger 
presence of noise traders. Thus, the optimism or pessimism of noise traders produces 
transitory deviations from fundamentals and price fluctuation. A drop in trading by 
sophisticated investors may also have an important impact on effective transaction costs 
by provoking an increase in market impact trading costs. All these responses will have 
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obvious implications deriving from a reduction in the informational efficiency of the 
market 
The degree of correlation basically depends on informational efficiency. If markets are 
informationally efficient, spot and futures returns should be perfectly correlated 
Informational efficiency cannot be assumed to be stable over time, irrespective of the 
investor mix or the width of the no-arbitrage band. The “create space” effect will 
therefore be relevant in a context of high market sentiment and in stocks favoured by 
noise traders. Rational investors prefer less exposure in the equity market, because they 
know that some kind of assets are over-priced and will tend to revert in the mid to long 
term (see Baker and Wurgler, 2006 or Chan, 2014 among others).  
Furthermore, the “create space” effect will not affect spot and futures markets to the 
same degree. Futures markets are dominated by institutional investors (Kavussanos et 
al 2008 and Bohl et al, 2011), who are assumed to be informed or rational. These 
informed or sophisticated traders, will reduce their arbitrage activity and their exposure 
in equity markets, and will thereby reduce trading volume to a greater extent in futures 
markets than in spot markets2. Change in the investor mix, however, will be more 
marked in the spot market, which will see a more significant increase in the presence of 
noise traders, while the futures market will continue to be dominated by institutional 
investors. 
In summary, during periods of market optimism, the “create space” effect will 
dominate other effects, so the no-arbitrage band will widen and, within that band, the 
price correlation of these two markets will weaken. This leads us to our first hypothesis.   
H1: High market sentiment reduces correlation between spot and futures markets. 
In a perfect market, the relationship between price movements in the futures index 
and underlying spot markets should be instantaneous, because they are both driven by 
the same market information. Under certain conditions (leverage, liquidity, transaction 
costs, investor mix), however, one market may assimilate new information more quickly 
than the other, thereby affecting volatility spillovers.  
Yang and Li (2013) extend the noisy rational expectation model (Grossman and 
Stiglitz, 1980) to present an analytical solution for the equilibrium price in the presence 
of sentiment, based on its decomposition into a rational term and a sentiment term.  The 
quality of information improves with the increasing presence of rational investors. This 
curbs the spread of sentiment, strengthens the role of information shocks and increases 
                                               
2 Note that the extent of the effect on trading volume in the spot market is unclear, because the reduced activity of 
institutional investors may be offset, wholly or in part, by a significant influx of noise traders. 
6 
 
market efficiency. Thus, in periods of high investor sentiment, the opposite effect will 
take place due to the “create space” effect, which, as already noted, reduces the 
proportion of rational investors in the market. 
Furthermore, according to the noise trading hypothesis, order flow is less informative 
when investors are optimistic. Shleifer and Summers (1990) or Peri et al (2014) state 
that, when arbitrage is limited and investor demand for securities responds to noise, 
security prices move in response to these changes in demand as well as to changes in 
fundamentals. In these circumstances, prices move more than their fundamentals would 
suggest, in simultaneous response to changes in the level of investor sentiment and to 
news3.  
During periods of high investor sentiment, these biases will make investors in 
general, and noise traders in particular, less alert to information coming from their own 
market, thus reducing the impact of news on volatility.  By the same token, they will 
also pay less attention to information coming from the other market.  Furthermore, noise 
traders’ reaction to bad news that contradicts their prior beliefs will have less impact on 
price formation. This means that, during periods of high investor sentiment, the impact 
of news from either market will be less asymmetric. This leads us to our second and 
third hypotheses, which state as follows:  
H2: During periods of high market sentiment, the impact of own-market news on 
volatility will be weaker and less asymmetric. 
H3: During periods of high market sentiment, the impact of other-market news on 
volatility will be weaker and less asymmetric. 
 
3. Database 
For the implementation of the analysis, this study uses daily closing prices and 
trading volume of the spot and futures markets for a period running from February 2001 
to December 2011. The data are taken from the US stock market and four European 
markets: namely France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Spain. The EuroStoxx50 is 
also included in order to represent the Euro zone. The reason for this choice of European 
markets is that the economies of the UK, France and Germany are considered, along 
with the US and Japan4, as extremely prominent on the global stage (Chang et al, 2012). 
According to the World Federation of Exchanges classification for 2011, the London SE 
                                               
3 Daniel et al (1998) assume that investors are overconfident about their private information. If investors are also affected 
by self-attribution bias, they will react asymmetrically to confirming versus disconfirming pieces of news and become even 
more over confident after receiving confirming news. Self-attribution bias leads investors to under react to the release of 
public information. The conservatism bias hypothesis states that investors do not fully adjust their priors to the arrival of 
new information (Barberis et al, 1998).  
4 Although it would have been interesting to include Japan, the necessary data were unavailable. 
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Group is the largest European stock exchange grouping in terms of capitalization, 
followed by NYSE Euronext (Europe), the Deutsche Börse and the BME Spanish 
Exchanges. The homogeneity of their financial development levels does not rule out some 
variation in shareholder structure, corporate governance (see La Porta et al, 1998) and 
cultural dimensions (see Hofstede, 2001) between the selected European countries, 
however. The market sample also includes representatives of both the Anglo Saxon and 
Continental financial systems. This combination of similarity and diversity strengthens 
the relevance of our findings by allowing us to determine whether institutional factors, 
unrelated to financial development, play a significant role in the impact of investor 
sentiment on cross-market correlation and volatility spillovers.  
The closing prices data, taken from the Datastream database (Thomson Financial), 
refer to the S&P500 index for the US stock market and to the five key European stock 
market indexes, namely, the CAC40 for France, the DAX30 for Germany, the FTSE-100 
for the UK, the IBEX35 for Spain, and the EuroStoxx50 index. The closing prices of the 
respective futures contracts were drawn from the Bloomberg database.  The returns for 
the spot index ( itS , ) and the futures index ( itF , ) computed each day t for each index i are 
defined as 
it
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The trading volume data on these markets (spot and futures) are drawn from the 
Datastream and the Bloomberg database, respectively. The variable used in the analysis 
is abnormal trading volume5, calculated for each index as: 
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where mitV
,  is the ordinary trading volume of each index i (S&P500, CAC40, DAX30, 
IBEX35, FTSE100 and EuroStoxx50) on day t, for each market m (s=spot and f=futures). 
Another of the variables considered in this analysis is investor sentiment. Previous 
studies have used a variety of sentiment indicators, and there is no consensus as to the 
best means of representing this unobservable variable6. In this paper we use the survey 
data of the American Association of Individual Investor (AAII) for the US market and a 
homologous survey of the European market:  SentixEuroStoxx 50, in line with DeBondt 
(1993), Lee et al (2002) or Brown and Cliff (2004) among others. 
The American Association of Individual Investors (AAII) survey began, in 1987, as a 
weekly survey of randomly selected AAII members. It asks participants to predict the 
                                               
5 The selected measure is similar to that used in papers such as Llorente et al (2002) or Covrig and Ng (2004). Given that 
our interest is in trading volume in futures markets, we use trading volume instead of turnover.  
6 See Brown and Cliff (2004) and Baker and Wurgler (2006) for indicators used in previous research.  
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likely direction of the stock market during the next six months and measures the 
percentages of individual investors responding “up”, “down”, and “the same”. The 
participants are randomly chosen from approximately 100,000 AAII members. Each 
week, the AAII compiles the results based on survey answers and labels the market as 
bullish, bearish or neutral. These results are published as ‘investor sentiment’ in 
monthly editions of AAII Journal.  
For a measure of investor sentiment in the European indexes analysed, we use survey 
data from SentixEuroStoxx 507. Since this survey began in February 2001, it has 
surveyed Sentix investors weekly, and currently has over 3100 registered participants, 
more than 77% of whom are individual investors. Participants are asked whether they 
are bullish, bearish, neutral, or have no opinion with regard to the future trend of the 
EuroStoxx50 stock index over the following one- and six-month periods8. 
We use the two survey measures (Sentix and AAII) as the spread between the 
percentages of bullish and bearish investors. According to the level of investor 
sentiment, each week is recorded as either a bullish (above-the-median) sentiment week 
or a bearish (below-the-median) sentiment week9. Both the AAII and the Sentix survey 
meet the necessary criteria with respect to frequency and trader awareness and both 
capture market sentiment well because they are calculated from a direct survey of the 
expected future state of the market. The results of the two surveys are also comparable 
because of the similarity of the question they put to the participants. Investor sentiment 
data were also drawn from Datastream. 
We use a direct survey measure of investor sentiment (explicit measure) instead of 
relying on other market-based (implicit) measures, since the complementary techniques 
needed to construct them could bias the final results. For the purposes of our analysis, 
moreover, we require a short-term measure of sentiment. The one we have selected is 
frequently-published and updated and its mode and date of construction are known and 
understood by traders. In fact, these surveys are a common measure of sentiment in the 
popular press and frequently mentioned in financial press articles10. Furthermore, since 
this is a public survey, it is available to all market agents, in contrast to the indirect 
measures mentioned earlier, which are calculated from whatever variables deemed 
appropriate, the choice potentially having more than negligible effects (see Corredor et 
                                               
7 In the absence of any sentiment measure of this kind for the UK, we consider this a valid approximation.   
8 The results shown are those obtained using the Sentix 6 month-ESX 50 Index for consistency with the AAII. For 
robustness checks, we later repeat the analysis using the Sentix 1 month-ESX 50 Index. 
9 Replies to the weekly survey are accepted up to Friday of the week in question, but the results are not published until 
the following Monday before trading opens. For the purposes of our study, we take the moment of optimism/pessimism to 
be Friday when the survey replies are being given. Repetition of the analysis using a dummy variable beginning the day 
after close of survey produced similar results. The results are available upon request.  
10 For example, Barron’s and the Financial Times. 
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al, 2013). Both our selected measures possess the above-mentioned characteristics, and 
therefore suit the purposes of our analysis.  
Finally, due to the nature of the target respondent, this survey is primarily a measure 
of individual investor sentiment. Given that the aim of this paper is to explore the 
relationship between spot and futures markets in high sentiment periods using 
arguments based largely on the observation of noise trader behaviour, the key variable 
to be incorporated is the level of optimism in individual investors, which, as already 
noted, is measured by the above mentioned surveys. This makes them more suitable for 
our present purposes than other measures proposed in the literature, in which 
individual investor sentiment is not measured directly but through approximation based 
on implicit market trading measures.  
 
4. Methodology and Results 
4.1 Methodology 
To model the effects of investor sentiment on correlation between spot and futures 
index returns and between the linkage in the second moments of the two markets, we 
use a bivariate GJR process.  
The model (henceforth, Model 1) for each index i (i = S&P500, CAC40, DAX30, 
IBEX35, FTSE100 and EuroStoxx50) takes the following form11: 
itsitiitiitsiiits eFASARAAR ,,,1,3,1,2,1,,1,0,, )( +−++= −−−  
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2
,1,
0
,1,,5
2
,1,,4
2
,1,,1,,3
2
,1,,2
2
,1,,1,0
2
,, itfitfiitfiitsitsiitsiitsiiits DeDe −−−−−−− +++++= εαεαασααασ  
2
,1,
0
,1,,5
2
,1,,4
2
,1,,1,,3
2
,1,,2
2
,1,,1,0
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,,,,,1,0,, itfitstiiitsf SENT σσγγσ +=                  i=1,6;                                                     (2) 
 
where )(
,1,3,1 itiit FAS −− − is the error correction term imposing the long-term equilibrium on 
index i in the two markets; itse ,, ( itfe ,, ) is the innovation in the spot (futures) market at 
day t for index i; 2
,, itsσ =var( itse ,, /Ωt-1,i) is the conditional variance of the spot market 
and 2
,, itfσ =var( itfe ,, /Ωt-1,i) is the conditional variance of the futures market, where Ωt,i is 
the information set available at t for index i. 
As shown, in the above variance equation the cross-market innovations have been 
added to a GJR specification. It is interesting to note that the innovation its ,,ε  ( itf ,,ε ) is 
used instead of itse ,, ( itfe ,, ). The reason for this choice is the intense cross-correlation 
                                               
11 Although not reported in the tables, some diagnostic tests of the residuals were performed. No indications of model 
misspecification were observed. The autocorrelations and partial correlations for the squared standardized residuals for 
stock index and index futures returns are all insignificantly different from zero.  
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between itse ,,  and itfe ,, which could lead to misleading estimates. The innovation its ,,ε   
( itf ,,ε ) is the information from the spot (futures) market which is transmitted to the 
futures (spot) market and is not included in itfe ,,  ( itse ,, ). Thus, its ,,ε  ( itf ,,ε ) is orthogonal to 
itse ,,  ( itfe ,, ). Formally, its ,,ε  ( itf ,,ε ) is computed as the residuals from a regression which 
can be written as )()()(
,,,,,,,,,1,0,,,, itfitsitsitfiiitfits eekkee εε++= .  its ,,ε and itf ,,ε have been 
incorporated into the 2
,, itsσ  and 
2
,, itfσ   equations respectively, to analyse the volatility 
spillover between the two markets on each index i. itsD ,, ( itfD ,, ) is a dummy variable 
which is 1 if itse ,, <0 ( itfe ,, <0) y 0 otherwise; 
0
,, itsD (
0
,, itfD ) is a dummy variable which is 1 if 
its ,,ε <0 ( itf ,,ε <0) and 0 otherwise. In the specification of the covariance, the constant 
correlation implied in the cost-of-carry model is assumed12.  
In order to test hypothesis 1, we introduce the dummy variable (SENT) into the model 
to allow this correlation to change as a function of investor sentiment. As already stated, 
this variable takes a value of 1 when the sentiment index is above the median level and 
0 otherwise. As sentiment proxies, we use the AAII for the US index and the Sentix 
index for the European indexes under analysis. The coefficient i,1γ  of these indexes 
indicates whether there is a change in contemporaneous correlation between the futures 
and spot markets. Consistent parameter estimates are obtained using the Berndt-Hall-
Hall-Hausman (BHHH) algorithm. 
Furthermore, these equations allow these innovations ( its ,,ε  and itf ,,ε ) to influence the 
conditional volatility asymmetrically, as do their own innovations ( itse ,,  and itfe ,, ). Thus, 
i,4α  and i,4β  measure the magnitude effect, whereas i,5α  and i,5β  measure the sign effect. 
The intuitive interpretation of these coefficients is very similar to that of their own 
innovations, but they are relative to cross-market volatility spillovers.  
In order to analyse the effect of sentiment on informational efficiency, we adjust 
Model 1 to include the dummy variable (SENT) described earlier, but now also 
associated to any information coming from the market under analysis (Model 2) and to 
negative news coming from its own market (Model 3). We also include the SENT variable 
as it affects information coming from the other market (Model 4) and the asymmetric 
response of volatility to news coming from the other market (Model 5). The unrestricted 
model, onto which we impose different restrictions to create the rest of the above-
mentioned models, is presented below: 
                                               
12 The covariance specification is similar to that used in Koutmos and Tucker (1996) 
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Model 2, 3, 4 and 5, impose the following restrictions: 
Model 2: 0
,9,8,7 === iii ααα ; and   0,9,8,7 === iii βββ  
Model 3: 0
,9,7,6 === iii ααα ; and  0,9,7,6 === iii βββ   
Model 4: 0
,9,8,6 === iii ααα ; and  0,9,8,6 === iii βββ   
Model 5: 0
,8,7,6 === iii ααα ; and   0,8,7,6 === iii βββ  
 
4.2 Results 
4.2.1 Trading volume analysis 
This paper analyses the impact of investor sentiment on the contemporaneous 
dynamics of the spot and futures markets and on volatility spillovers between them. The 
immediate empirical question is whether, as can be deduced from the behavioural 
finance literature, the level of investor sentiment has a significant impact on the total 
trading volume in each market. To shed some light on this question, we present an 
analysis of abnormal trading volume in relation to the level of investor sentiment. In 
particular, we test for variation in abnormal trading volume in both spot and futures 
markets at times of high investor sentiment. In addition, because the Engle’s test results 
reveal the presence of ARCH effects, the variance is modelled by means of a GARCH(1,1) 
specification, which takes the following form: 
mit
j
mi
jtmijFmiThmiTmiMmitmimi
mi
t eAVDDDDSENTAV ,,
5
1
,
,,5,,4,,3,,2,,1,,
, +∑++++++=
=
−+γγγγγβα   (4)                                                   
where mite ,,  follows a N(0, 
2
,, mitσ );
2
,,1,,2
2
,,1,,1,,0
2
,, mitmimitmimimit e −− ++= σααασ  
 
mi
tAV
,  is the abnormal daily trading volume for market m (spot or futures) and index i. 
As independent variables, we include a dummy (SENT), which takes a value of 1 if 
investor sentiment is above the median level and 0 otherwise and 4 day-of-the-week 
dummies ( MD , TD , ThD and FD ) which take a value of 1 if it is Monday, Tuesday, Thursday 
or Friday, respectively and 0 otherwise. The equation is estimated using an AR(5). 
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As shown in table 1, Panel A, during periods of high investor sentiment, overall 
trading volume in spot markets is not significantly affected. The results for the futures 
market, shown in table 1, Panel B, show a negative effect which is clearly significant in 
all indexes considered13.  
The observed variations in trading volume strengthen the rationale for testing their 
capacity to trigger changes in price dynamics between spot and futures markets, given 
the potential impact of such changes on the response of both markets to news. It is also 
important to emphasize that, while there is no significant change in the level of trading 
activity in spot markets14, it can be seen to decrease significantly in futures markets. 
This increases market impact costs in futures markets, thereby widening the no-
arbitrage band. 
The results of this test are compatible with behavioural finance arguments; in 
particular, the “create space” effect. Given that noise traders tend to concentrate in less 
complex assets, their activities will be more noticeable in spot markets. Furthermore, 
seeing the market to be overpriced, institutional traders are likely to limit their activity 
until prices to revert to their fundamentals. Our results indicate that, in spot markets, 
this reduction is probably offset by an increase in noise trading, while there is no 
significant change in abnormal trading volume. Due to the absence of this effect in 
futures markets, abnormal trading volume decreases significantly. It is important to 
note that, although it is not possible from this analysis to judge whether the investor mix 
has actually changed in one or both of these markets, the results are compatible with 
such a possibility15. A simple analysis of the case of Eurostoxx50 reveals that the 
average size of abnormal transactions during periods of high investor sentiment 
decreases significantly in spot markets while registering no significant change in futures 
markets16. These last results are compatible with some of the papers mentioned above, 
which report an increase of noise traders and a reduction of institutional trading activity 
in bullish spot markets. This supports the arguments given above, particularly those 
concerning the “create space” effect, thereby providing rationale for performing a specific 
                                               
13 The exception is the Spanish index, although this negative effect is significant at a 14% significance level. 
14 Although the results for the Eurostoxx50, the only market for which we have data, suggest a significant change in 
investor mix due to a higher proportion of noise traders, as predicted by the “create space” effect. 
15 It is very difficult to obtain investor trading data for all the markets analysed. Several papers use transaction size to 
isolate individual from institutional trading activity, however the resulting data are imperfect. In fact, Barclay and 
Warner (1993) state that, in the presence of informed trading, there is a higher incentive for traders to make medium-size 
trades in order to camouflage their strategies and thus avoid revealing information (stealth trading), a phenomenon for 
which several papers have provided evidence (see Blasco et al, 2010). 
16 The unavailability of such data in the Datastream database prevents us from providing the results for other markets. 
The data (number of transactions and trading volume) are drawn from Eurex annual reports on derivative markets (1998-
2013) and from the Nyse-Euronext for the spot market (2004-2013). We compute the monthly average abnormal 
transaction size (AATS) by deducting the mean of the three previous months. In spot markets, the AATS decreases by 
69.35% (p=0.097), while in futures markets, it increases by 197% but is not significantly different from zero at 
conventional significance levels. 
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analysis of potential change in the contemporaneous correlation and information flow 
between markets as a result of changes in investor sentiment. 
 
4.2.2 Impact of investor sentiment on correlation between spot and futures 
markets 
The estimates from Model 1 are shown in table 2. With respect to the means, it is 
worth noting the significantly negative sign of the coefficient on the lagged return in all 
spot and futures markets analysed. Meanwhile, the error correction term parameter is 
significant in all of the markets. The parameter data for the conditional variance 
equation show that volatility is affected by own-market shocks17 ( 1α  and 1β ). Both the 
persistence coefficients ( 2α  and 2β ) and the asymmetry coefficients ( 3α  and 3β ), are 
positive and significant, with values falling within the usual ranges, thus confirming 
that negative shocks increase volatility within a given market.  
The model also captures other parameters affected by global volatility spillovers and 
negative shocks. We find that both the parameters involved in global information 
transfer from the other market ( 4α and 4β ) are, as expected, positive and significant 
overall. In the case of the parameters involved in the asymmetric impact of negative 
shocks ( 5α and 5β ), the results are less clear, although most of them are positive and 
significant18.  
In testing test hypothesis H1, given that the model permits correlation to vary as a 
function of market sentiment, we need to examine the parameter associated with this 
change ( 1γ ). The results reveal that, when investor sentiment is high, correlation 
decreases in all the markets analysed. This decrease is significant at the 1% level in all 
cases19, thus confirming Hypothesis 1.  
This shows that high investor sentiment weakens information efficiency by reducing 
correlation between markets. The importance of the “create space” effect20 can be seen in 
the observed alterations in trading volume and investor mix in the markets considered, 
which have ultimately had a significant impact on their correlation21. Additionally, any 
                                               
17 In the case of DAX30 and S&P500 these parameters are not significantly different from zero. 
18Note that the figures of these parameters ( 4α , 5α , 4β  and 5β ) are not comparable to ( 1α , 3α , 1β  and 3β ) because  they 
are obtained using itm ,,ε  instead of itme ,, . 
19 Given the availability of the sentiment indicator affecting the trend of the German market DAX30, we performed a 
robustness test by repeating the analysis using this measure. Since the findings were practically the same as for the 
Sentix Eurostoxx50, we decided to adopt the latter for its consistency with other European markets. The results are 
available from the authors upon request.  
20 Lee et al (2002) report, in this respect, that, when investors are bullish, the “create space” effect dominates the 
Friedman effect.  
21 Firstly, the significant influx of noise traders to spot markets widens the gap separating them from futures markets in 
terms of investor mix. In addition, the drop in the proportion of institutional investors in both markets reduces arbitrage 
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decrease in investor activity, will, in itself, reduce correlation between the two markets 
because of the direct relationship between trading volume and correlation (see Stoll and 
Whaley, 1990, Chan, 1992). In the same vein, Bohl et al (2011) show that derivatives and 
spot markets will correlate increasingly as institutional investors become more active. 
The reduction in trading volume in futures markets implies a widening of the no-
arbitrage band, allowing prices to deviate further from equilibrium without giving 
arbitrageurs incentives to correct them, and reducing contemporaneous correlation 
between spot and futures prices22.  
 
4.2.3 Effects of investor sentiment on the impact of news on volatility  
Given that the aim of this section is to analyse the effect of sentiment information 
coming from its own market, the models to be analysed are, specifically, Model 2 and 
Model 3. The estimates are given in table 3. The variables it shares with Model 1 behave, 
overall, as described earlier23. Observation of the coefficients on the impact of sentiment 
on information ( 6α for the spot market and 6β  for the futures market) shows all of them 
as negative and significant. The negative sign tells us that, during periods of high 
investor sentiment, information reaching the market has a lower impact on prices, 
consistent with over-confidence and self-attribution among uninformed investors, and 
thus less impact on volatility24. Note that this effect may be further strengthened by the 
effective widening of the no-arbitrage bands. These arguments are confirmed by the 
results for both types of markets. 
The coefficients on the variable used to capture the effect of sentiment on volatility 
asymmetry 8α and 8β (Model 3) are clearly significant. In fact, all six indexes analysed 
show a significant decrease in volatility asymmetry in the presence of negative shocks. 
Once again, we observe this pattern in both types of markets.  
This set of results confirms hypothesis H2 and suggests that, when investor 
sentiment is high, news plays a somewhat less important role in price setting due to the 
biases of noise traders, the proportion of which is greater in high than low sentiment 
periods. As expected, this reduction in the role of information is particularly noticeable 
                                                                                                                                                   
activity and allows prices to deviate further from their fundamentals. Finally, the reduction in trading activity increases 
market impact costs, thus widening the no-arbitrage band in the futures market, and lowering the trading incentives of 
rational investors. 
22 In this line of research, Aragó et al (2003) show that the decrease in transaction costs in the futures markets increases 
the correlation between spot and futures prices.  
23 To save space we show just the coefficients related to investor sentiment.  
24 Note that this effect may be further strengthened by the effective widening of the no-arbitrage bands. These arguments 
are confirmed by the results for both types of markets. 
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in the asymmetric effect on volatility, probably as a consequence of noise traders’ failure 
to react to bad news that contradicts their prior beliefs.  
The results are therefore in line with the noise trading hypothesis. When sentiment is 
high, order flow is less informative. Extreme sentiment curbs arbitrage and investor 
demand reacts not only to changes in fundamentals but also to noise trading, which is 
intensified by the level of investor sentiment. Note that this is due to noise traders 
becoming more active than arbitrageurs, especially in the spot market. Driven by over-
optimism and overconfidence in their own information, noise traders ignore external 
information shocks and go on trading regardless, thus lessening the impact of news on 
volatility and reducing information efficiency.  
 
4.2.4 Effects of investor sentiment on volatility spillovers 
The next step is to test the effect of sentiment on volatility spillovers, which we do by 
starting from the unrestricted model described in the previous section and devising two 
new models, Model 4 which analyses the impact on information coming from the other 
market and Model 5 which examines the asymmetric effect of that information on 
volatility.  
The estimates are also shown in table 3. Coefficients 7α  and 7β (Model 4) capture the 
impact of sentiment on information coming from the other market. It should be noted 
that the cross-market shocks considered, including those affected by sentiment, are 
orthogonal to the information originating in their own markets. As can be seen, when 
sentiment is high, we find a generalised decrease in cross-market volatility spillovers. In 
fact, both coefficients in all 6 indexes analysed are highly statistically significant. These 
results are consistent with those obtained for the effect on own- market volatility. It is 
also important to note that news can originate not only from the release of exogenous 
information, but also from that of endogenous information conveyed through trading. If, 
during periods of high sentiment, there is a drop in trading, there will also be a drop in 
trading news and, presumably, in the amount of trading news reaching the other 
market. 
Coefficients 9α and 9β (Model 5) associated with the effect of sentiment on the 
transmission of negative shocks in the spot and futures markets, respectively, are nearly 
all negatively signed, although significant in FTSE100 futures and the S&P500 spot 
market. This means that, in this case, the level of investor sentiment does not affect the 
asymmetric reaction of volatility to negative shocks coming from the other market. 
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These results only partially confirm H3, since, although, as predicted, we observe 
that, in periods of high investor sentiment, volatility in one market is less affected by 
news coming from the other, the decrease in volatility asymmetry following bad news 
from the other market lacks statistical significance. Again, the results, at least partially, 
confirm the noise trading hypothesis.  The “create space” effect deters arbitrage, which is 
necessary for informational efficiency, just when the proportion of noise traders is 
swelling. Informed traders unwilling to increase their risk exposure withdraw from the 
market, leaving a dominant proportion of uninformed investors trading on their own 
beliefs, in disregard both of information coming from its own market, but also of 
information coming from the other market.  
Finally, there is minimal variation in any of the findings across the cases analysed, 
allowing us to conclude that they are robust to possible country-specific institutional or 
cultural factors, at least in the developed market context in which this paper is situated. 
 
4.2.5 Robustness checks 
Our purpose in this next section is to analyse the robustness of the results reported 
above, by examining the sensitivity of our results to four issues: a) extremely bullish 
sentiment, b) the time horizon for the sentiment measure25 c) market status and d) the 
economic cycle effect in the sentiment proxy. 
The first test is to adjust the sentiment dummy in order to check the robustness of the 
results to its mode of construction. This variable was initially defined to identify a period 
in which market sentiment had risen above the median level. In this new analysis, the 
variable is adjusted to capture periods of more extreme levels of sentiment. Taking the 
top 25% to be high sentiment periods, the variable takes a value of 1 in these periods and 
0 otherwise. Table 4 summarizes the coefficient estimates for this analysis. The results 
show that cross-market correlation drops significantly during periods of high investor 
sentiment, thus confirming H1. They also reveal that volatility is less affected by news 
from either market. At the same time, volatility asymmetry during such periods is found 
to be less affected by own-market news, while the effect of other-market news remains 
unchanged. This confirms H2 and partially confirms H3. This consistency with the 
results of the initial analysis confirms their robustness to the construction of the 
sentiment variables.  
                                               
25 The robustness test will be available only for the Sentix measure, since AAII does not consider horizons of less than 6 
months. 
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As already stated, the Sentix survey issues two EuroStoxx forecasts; one with a one-
month horizon, and another with a six-month horizon. The second robustness test 
focuses on sensitivity to the time horizon for the sentiment measure. The results given in 
the tables shown so far are based on the six-month forecast. However, since the AAII 
issues only a six-month forecast, we repeated the analysis using the Sentix EuroStoxx 
one-month forecast. The resulting coefficient estimates, given in table 5, are similar to 
those reported above, in that high market sentiment triggers a significant decrease in 
correlation, the reaction of volatility to own-market news (models 2 and 3) and volatility 
spillovers (models 4 and 5). This clear reduction in correlation allows us to confirm H1. 
The results for H2 and H3, however, differ slightly from those reported in the earlier 
analyses. Although the impact of news on volatility decreases, as predicted in both these 
hypotheses, there is a difference in the asymmetric impact of bad news on volatility. 
While there is barely any significant change in the effect of “own-market” bad news, a 
large number of the markets analysed show a significant reduction in the impact of 
“other-market” negative news. This enables confirmation of H3 and partial confirmation 
of H2. 
Overall, the results obtained, both in terms of correlation and the information effect, 
show no major variations attributable to the choice of time horizon for estimating the 
sentiment variable or to its mode of construction, and can therefore be considered highly 
robust. The only difference worth noting is that which can be observed in the asymmetric 
impact of news on volatility. When we use the six-month sentiment index, asymmetric 
volatility decreases only as a reaction to shocks in its own market, whereas, when we use 
the one-month sentiment index, it is found to decrease in response to news from the 
other market. These findings confirm the impact of investor sentiment on volatility 
asymmetry, although the type of information that produces the effect appears to depend 
on the time horizon. 
It is well known that financial assets and financial markets become highly correlated 
during financial crises (see, among others, Preis et al., 2012 or Krause and Tse, 2013). 
Also, the effects of volatility are asymmetric over the cycle. As the high and low 
sentiment times identified may be a reflection of the state of the cycle, our third test is to 
re-run our models for the tranquil times between 2003 and 2007. As expected, the results 
obtained persist (see table 6) suggesting that the effects on the joint dynamics of spot 
and futures markets are due to the effect of investor sentiment.  
Finally, given that the sentiment index may include a sentiment component as well as 
a common economic cycle component, it could be interesting to run the analysis with a 
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sentiment measure that explicitly removes the effect of possible changes in the economic 
cycle. A common solution is to orthogonalise the sentiment proxy to macroeconomic 
variables (see, among others, Baker and Wurgler, 2006). In our four robustness tests, we 
analyse the US market for the sake of simplicity.  Macroeconomic variables are harder to 
analyse in the four European markets and the EuroStoxx50 index, because the Sentix 
survey does not use a homogeneous proportion of participants in all countries.  The 
macroeconomic variables considered are the industrial production index, consumption of 
durable and non-durable goods and the unemployment rate.  The results for the US 
market are very robust. Correlation between the AAII index and the AAII orthogonal 
index is 0.93 (p-value=0.00) and the conclusions obtained for the US market are 
consistent with those obtained with the non-orthogonal sentiment index. Given that the 
inclusion of the macroeconomic variables had a negligible effect on the results and due to 
the difficulty of their consideration in the SentixEuroStoxx 50, they were not considered 
in our analysis. The results are omitted for reasons of space but can be obtained from the 
authors on request. 
 
5. Discussion 
The results described above show that, during periods of high investor sentiment, 
there are significant changes in the investor mix in financial markets, because the 
increased presence of noise traders causes sophisticated investors to reduce their risk 
exposure. This change in investor mix produces different effects in the spot and futures 
markets, with important repercussions for correlation and information flow between the 
two. Specifically, a statistically significant decrease in correlation between the two 
markets is found to occur during periods of high investor sentiment. Although the 
reduction amounts to no more than 0.1% to 1%, according to which market we are 
looking at, apart from the obvious theoretical implications, it is worth analysing whether 
the decrease in correlation has any economically significant impact. 
For a more detailed evaluation of the practical implications, we use a simplified 
analysis of two phenomena relating directly to changes in correlation between the two 
markets, namely, hedging effectiveness and futures mispricing. 
 
5.1 Hedging effectiveness 
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The hedge ratio is the ratio of the number of units traded in the futures market to the 
number of units traded in the spot market. The classic objective of hedging is to 
minimise the variance of the hedged position of index i at time t ( itHR ,, )26 
Min (Var ( itHR ,, ))=Min Var( itftits RhR ,,,, − )      (5) 
where itsR ,,  and itfR ,,  are the cash and futures return of index i at time t, respectively. 
As is well known, the first derivative test gives us: 
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where th  is the minimum-variance hedge ratio (MVHR). It is important to note 
that )().(.),(
,,,,,,,,
,,,
itfitsitfits RRRRCov itfs σσρ= , so th depends on the correlation coefficient 
between itsR ,,  and itfR ,,  ( itfs ,,,ρ ). 
In the case in hand, we have four alternative estimates of th . For the sake of 
simplicity, and as a benchmark, we consider only Model 1, in which sentiment is 
included only in the covariance between spot and futures, assuming the absence of direct 
sentiment effects on the conditional spot and futures variances ( Senttt hh = ). The 
alternative estimations are one using the same procedure as in Model 1 but omitting 
sentiment from the aforementioned spot-futures covariance ( OSenttt hh = ); and two basic 
models: one using the constant hedging ratio ( hht = ), based on the unconditional 
variances and covariances between the two series; and one using the naïve hedging ratio, 
where th  is assumed to be one ( 1=th ). Given that this application is intended for 
explanatory purposes, we simplify the process by performing an in-sample analysis. 
For each estimation of th , two transaction-cost assumptions are analysed. The first is 
a theoretical case, which assumes the absence of transaction costs (TC=0); the second 
assumes transaction costs to be small but reasonable marginal costs for institutional 
investors (TC=0.03%)27. Given that, in the zero transaction costs case, th  will probably 
be different from 1−th , the hedge portfolio will be adjusted on a daily basis in the two 
dynamic hedge strategies ( Sentth  and
OSent
th ), and kept constant throughout the whole 
period of analysis in the other two strategies ( h  and 1).  
                                               
26 The optimal hedge ratio (OHR) is the ratio that maximises an objective function and the MVHR is the ratio that 
minimises the variance of the hedging position, although under some conditions, the MVHR is equal to OHR 
27 We have used 0.03%. Note that we do not consider all of the costs for any investor. We consider the marginal trading 
costs for institutional investors. For example the trading fees for E-mini S&P500 for equity or clearing members are $0.35 
per side per contract. These fees are 0.50 Euros for trading Dax30 futures contracts, 0.30 Euros for Eurostoxx 50 futures 
contracts, 0.15 Euros for CAC40 futures contracts,   0.25 Euros for Ibex35 futures contracts, and 0.20 Pounds Sterling for 
FTSE 100 futures contracts. In all these cases the marginal costs are below 0.03%. 
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Under the assumption of transaction costs, the decision whether or not to adjust the 
hedge ratio is taken on the basis that the aim is to maximise the following utility 
function28 )()(
,, tHtH RVarRE λ− , where )( ,tHRE  is the expected return on the hedged 
position, )(
,tHRVar is its variance and λ in the investor risk aversion parameter. 
Assuming )(
,tHRE to be null before transaction costs and a risk-aversion parameter of 429, 
the decision whether or not to adjust hedging is given by the following expression: 
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where 
,*th  is the last hedge ratio to satisfy condition (7). 
As hedging effectiveness measure, Table 7 shows the percentage reduction in the 
variance ( xRVar ) of the benchmark hedged position using 
Sent
th  relative to that obtained 
using the ratio X ( OSentth , h  and 1). Formally: 
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where )( xHRVar  is the variance of the hedged position using the hedge ratio X ( OSentth , h  
and 1) and )( bHRVar  is the variance of the hedged position using the dynamic hedge ratio 
obtained from Model 1 ( Sentth ) , the model considered as the benchmark model for this 
analysis. 
As can be seen, when sentiment is considered as a relevant variable in spot-futures 
correlation, the variance of the benchmark hedged position is lower than the variance in 
the others, albeit not to the same extent across all the markets analysed, where we 
obtain a reduction in the variance of only 0.03% in the case of the CAC40, a very similar 
level for the Eurostoxx50, FTSE and S&P500, and a slightly higher one for the Dax30 
and Ibex35 (0.67% and 0.77%). The reductions with respect to the constant hedge ratio 
(from 0.48% to 11.59%) are considerably greater, and obviously greater again with 
respect to the Naïve ratio (from 0.84% to 14.56%). To contextualise the results a little 
more thoroughly, we calculated the percentage reduction in variance of the hedged 
position with, versus without, sentiment in the dynamic hedge ratio (using Sentth  instead 
of OSentth , that is, OSent
th
RVar ) and compared the results with that obtained using  the 
constant ratio (using Sentth  instead of h , that is, hRVar  ) which takes into account neither 
sentiment nor changes in the variances and co-variances of the series derived from the 
                                               
28 See Kroner  and Sultan (1993). 
29 This value is commonly found  in the literature (see Aragó and Salvador, 2011) 
21 
 
GJR modelling used in the study. This relationship is given by the RIS ratio 
(
h
h
RVar
RVar
RIS
OSent
t
= ). It is interesting to observe that the reduction in variance achieved by 
incorporating sentiment into the dynamic hedging model is between 1.01% and 80.72% 
of that achieved by the constant hedging model. This suggests that the improvement, 
albeit modest, is not as negligible as a simple interpretation of the initial result might 
suggest.  
As can be expected, the results assuming transaction costs of 0.03% are less striking 
overall, because any improvement to be achieved by means of hedge adjustments would 
not be worth the transaction costs involved. Indeed, if high enough, transaction costs 
could potentially render spot-futures correlation virtually negligible. In any event, the 
reduction in the variance of the hedged position using Sentth  ranges between 0.05% and 
0.97% and the RIS ratio ranges between 23.86% and 78.72%. 
 
5.2 Stock index futures mispricing 
The second application is on mispricing in stock index futures. Having shown that 
high sentiment raises the proportion of noise traders in the spot market to a very high 
level, thereby prompting institutional investors to reduce their exposure to noise trading 
risk (the “create space” effect), we can reasonably assume that this will result in lower 
market liquidity, lower trading volume and a higher bid-ask spread, due to a decline in 
arbitrage activity. Given the non-negligible role of the bid-ask spread in market impact 
costs, any increase in it will mean increased likelihood of mispricing. Thus, if the 
reasoning is correct, we should see a significant increase in the mispricing of futures 
contracts in high sentiment periods. 
We test this hypothesis by calculating the relative absolute spread of the futures 
contracts and checking to see if it is significantly higher in periods of high investor 
sentiment. 
The theoretical valuation is based on the cost-of-carry model. The mispricing of 
futures on index j at time t tjM ,  is computed as the relative absolute spread between 
actual futures market prices tjF ,  and our theoretical cost-of-carry valuation30 
CC
tjF ,  
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δ
, where t is the current date; T is the expiration date of the futures contract; Sj,t is the price of the 
underlying asset j at time t; δ = ln(1+i), i is the riskless interest rate; and q is the dividend yield. For simplicity, we 
compute the cost-of-carry valuation for the index future at time t using average implied dividends over the period t-1 to t-
5. We assume this dividend yield to be a good proxy for the actual dividend yields at time t. In any case, any errors in this 
procedure are unrelated to the variable of interest (investor sentiment) because they are mainly related with the dividend 
amounts and dates paid per index component. To proxy for the risk-free interest rate, we use the Euribor 3-month rate for 
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We use absolute spread because we are interested in any mispricing, whatever the 
sign. This enables us to cancel out errors with opposite signs. Finally, we use relative 
absolute spread because it enables us to compare the results through time (2001-2011) 
and the index showed considerable variations over the sample period. 
Table 8 presents the ratios of average mispricing in high sentiment periods to average 
mispricing in low sentiment periods. In two cases, the CAC40 and the S&P500, the ratio 
is less than but very close to 1. In the case of the Dax30, however, the mispricing of 
futures is 2.69% higher in high sentiment periods than in low sentiment periods. The 
same ratio is 1.23% in the FTSE and 0.72% in the Ibex. However, the level of 
significance is very high in all cases. Thus, we cannot reject the null that mispricing is 
unrelated to the level of investor sentiment. 
It should be noted that, in the above analysis, high/low sentiment is measured as a 
dummy variable that takes a value of 1 when the index value is above/below the median 
of the series. This might cancel out mispricing that occurs during low sentiment periods. 
Nevertheless, since prices deviate from equilibrium in both high and low sentiment 
periods, we tested for differences in the mispricing of futures in both these contexts 
(defined as investor sentiment levels above/below the 75th/25th percentile of the 
distribution of the sentiment index being considered) as compared with periods of 
moderate investor sentiment (between the 25th and 75th percentiles). 
Here, the results are considerably clearer. In fact, in extreme sentiment periods, the 
level of mispricing is between 0.26% (in the case of the DAX30) and 10.27% (in that of 
the CAC40) higher than in periods of moderate sentiment. It is 10.07% higher in the 
S&P500 and 5.02% higher in the Ibex. In the last three cases, moreover, the differences 
in relative absolute spread between extreme and moderate sentiment periods are 
statistically significant.  
In summary, our findings in both applications highlight the importance of including 
investor sentiment in the analysis due to its impact on dynamic spot-futures correlation. 
Specifically, we have found that it leads to reductions of the variance in the hedged 
position, which, while small, are far from negligible, needing to be contextualised for 
each market and time period considered, and allowing no general conclusions to be 
drawn. Furthermore, the analysis has shown mispricing in futures contracts to be 
                                                                                                                                                   
the Dax30 and Eurostoxx 50, the Euribor 1-month rate for the Ibex35 and CAC 40, the 3-month LIBOR rate for the 
FTSE100 and the 90 days financial commercial paper rate. 
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related to the level of market sentiment. In particular, it is found that extreme 
sentiment periods generate significantly higher levels of mispricing than moderate 
sentiment periods. 
The variability between markets detected in the brief analysis performed herein 
suggests the need for a deeper analysis involving more markets and a diversity of 
financial development levels, in order to reach more generalisable conclusions. Given 
that various studies have shown the magnitude of the investor sentiment effect to 
depend not only on stock characteristics but also on cultural and institutional factors 
affecting the markets (see Chiou et al, 2010 Chui et al, 2010 or Corredor et al, 2013 
among others), the proposed analysis might help to shed new light on classic issues, such 
as the hedging of portfolios or asset mispricing, among others. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This study establishes a link between the published research on volatility dynamics 
and investor sentiment. Through its potential influence on investor behaviour, high 
sentiment can have a significant impact on correlation between both markets and 
volatility dynamics. Due to differences in spot and futures market characteristics 
(investor mix, transaction costs, leverage,…), changes in investor sentiment levels could 
affect their trading volume, effective transaction costs, and investor mix in different 
ways and may therefore significantly alter the contemporaneous dynamics between 
them. To explore this issue, we analyse spot and futures markets on stock market 
indexes in different countries: the S&P500 for the US, and a representative set of 
European indexes (CAC40, DAX30, FTSE100, IBEX35 and Eurostoxx50).  
In line with behavioural finance theories, the results of our first analysis have shown 
that an increased presence of noise traders in the market causes sophisticated investors, 
faced with an increase in arbitraging risk due to the irrational behaviour of noise 
traders, and conscious of over-pricing, to reduce their trading activity until prices revert 
to their fundamentals (by the “create space” effect). Due to the predominance of informed 
traders in futures markets, an increase in investor sentiment leads to a significant 
reduction in trading volume, pushing up effective transaction costs and widening the no-
arbitrage band in all the countries considered. In spot markets, on the other hand, the 
increase in trading volume brought about by an increase in activity by noise traders is 
offset by the reduction in the trading activity of informed traders, such that the net effect 
on trading volume produces no significantly abnormal values. This, however, must not 
blind us to the fact that, while trading volume remains roughly the same, the investor 
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mix in the market in question may have changed considerably. This difference in trading 
activity and investor mix, which occurs in spot and futures markets as a result of 
changes in investor sentiment, suggests a possible change in contemporaneous volatility 
dynamics between the two markets. 
Consistent with our expectations, we have shown that the degree of correlation is not 
stable with the level of investor sentiment. More specifically, the correlation between the 
two markets diminishes significantly during periods of high investor sentiment. 
Moreover, the impact of news on volatility in either market is also found to be less 
significant during these periods (according to the noise trading hypothesis). To a lesser 
degree, the same can be said of the asymmetric impact of negative shocks on volatility, 
although it is worth noting that the results are sensitive to the time horizon employed in 
the estimation of investor sentiment. 
The main results obtained are very similar across all the markets analysed, 
suggesting that cultural and institutional frameworks do not play a crucial role in this 
issue, or at least not in the developed market context in which this paper is situated. In 
spite of this homogeneity, the specific results of the effect of sentiment on spot-futures 
dynamics, and the specific characteristics of futures contracts, fees, etc… can produce 
economic differences between markets (and probably through time), as shown in the case 
of hedging effectiveness and, more particularly, the mispricing of futures contracts 
analysed in the discussion section.  
Finally, these findings reveal that the joint dynamics of spot and futures markets is 
strongly influenced by trading activity and by variables affecting trading behaviour, one 
of these being investor sentiment.  
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Table 1. Effect of sentiment on abnormal volume in the spot and futures markets. 2001-2011  
Panel A: Spot Market 
 CAC40 DAX30 EUROSTOXX50 IBEX35 FTSE100 S&P500 
α 0.097*** 0.056*** 0.066*** 0.064*** 0.057*** 0.055*** 
β -0.012 0.017 -0.001 0.002 -0.003 -0.004 
γ1 -0.286*** -0.279*** -0.236*** -0.213*** -0.239*** -0.142*** 
γ2 -0.012 -0.026 -0.015 -0.019 0.027** -0.007 
γ3 -0.009 -0.014 -0.011 -0.036** -0.025** -0.026*** 
γ4 -0.050*** 0.020 -0.020 -0.022 -0.070*** -0.078*** 
α0 0.026*** 0.007*** 0.036*** 0.005*** 0.015*** 0.010*** 
α1 0.249*** 0.196*** 0.172*** 0.048*** 0.204*** 0.256*** 
α2 0.354*** 0.749*** 0.123 0.869*** 0.477*** 0.380*** 
 
Panel B: Futures Market 
 CAC40 DAX30 EUROSTOXX50 IBEX35 FTSE100 S&P500 
α 0.155*** 0.099*** 0.133*** 0.098*** 0.026 0.044*** 
β -0.031* -0.019* -0.029** -0.017 -0.029*** -0.025** 
γ1 -0.178*** -0.203*** -0.271*** -0.099*** -0.141*** -0.161*** 
γ2 0.079** 0.019 0.041 0.105*** 0.056** 0.066*** 
γ3 -0.033 -0.012 -0.043 -0.133*** -0.007 -0.053*** 
γ4 -0.366*** -0.093*** -0.229*** -0.349*** -0.099*** -0.087*** 
α0 0.074*** 0.098*** 0.042*** 0.061* 0.017*** 0.003*** 
α1 0.084*** 0.423*** 0.062*** 0.042** 0.358*** 0.056*** 
α2 0.522*** 0.081 0.600*** 0.517** 0.601*** 0.914*** 
 
 
The sentiment effect (coefficient β) on abnormal trading volume in the spot market (Panel A) and the futures 
market (Panel B). AV is the abnormal volume of index i and market m (spot or futures). SENT is the dummy 
variable that takes a value of 1 if sentiment is above the median level and 0 otherwise. DM, DT, DTh y DF are 
dummy variables that take a value of 1 on Mondays, Tuesdays, Thursdays and Fridays, respectively. The 
estimation includes an AR(5) process.***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of significance, 
respectively. 
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Table 2. Impact of investor sentiment on the correlation between spot market and futures market (Model 1). 
2001-2011 
 
 CAC40 DAX30 EUROSTOXX50 FTSE100 IBEX35 S&P500 
A0 -0.590 0.018 0.720** -0.129 0.083 1.062** 
A1 -0.129*** -0.164*** -0.214*** -0.220*** -0.145*** -0.194*** 
A2 0.127 0.006 -0.102** 0.024 -0.024 -0.118** 
A3 0.998*** 0.999*** 0.991*** 0.994*** 0.999*** 0.987*** 
B0 -0.944 -0.420** -0.119 -0.848** -0.190 -0.899* 
B1 -0.126** -0.151*** -0.231*** -0.207*** -0.145*** -0.181*** 
B2 0.368* 0.366*** 0.019 0.155*** 0.203*** 0.099* 
α0 0.271*** 0.026*** 0.049*** 0.029*** 0.065*** 0.013*** 
α1 0.019*** 0.006 0.012* 0.016** 0.046*** 0.004 
α2 0.722*** 0.879*** 0.839*** 0.891*** 0.827*** 0.899*** 
α3 0.298*** 0.122*** 0.156*** 0.098*** 0.109*** 0.060*** 
α4 2.869*** 0.679*** 0.550*** 0.398*** 1.275*** 0.320*** 
α5 -0.774* 0.654*** 0.211** -0.060 0.294 0.086*** 
β0 0.283*** 0.027*** 0.050*** 0.027*** 0.069*** 0.016*** 
β1 0.027*** 0.002 0.017** 0.019*** 0.051*** -0.005 
β2 0.709*** 0.879*** 0.828*** 0.890*** 0.815*** 0.906*** 
β3 0.285*** 0.118*** 0.106*** 0.002 0.110*** 0.153*** 
β4 2.362*** 0.945*** 0.960*** 0.326*** 1.707*** 0.166*** 
β5 0.627*** 0.010 0.044* 0.091*** 0.316* 0.058* 
γ0 0.990*** 0.983*** 0.969*** 0.980*** 0.989*** 0.982*** 
γ1 -0.001*** -0.009*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.001*** -0.008*** 
 
Model 1 
itsitiitiitsiiits eFASARAAR ,,,1,3,1,2,1,,1,0,, )( +−++= −−−  
itfitiitiitfiiitf eFASBRBBR ,,,1,3,1,2,1,,1,0,, )( +−++= −−−  
2
,1,
0
,1,,5
2
,1,,4
2
,1,,1,,3
2
,1,,2
2
,1,,1,0
2
,, itfitfiitfiitsitsiitsiitsiiits DeDe −−−−−−− +++++= εαεαασααασ  
2
,1,
0
,1,,5
2
,1,,4
2
,1,,1,,3
2
,1,,2
2
,1,,1,0
2
,, itsitsiitsiitfitfiitfiitfiiitf DeDe −−−−−−− +++++= εβεββσβββσ  
;)(
,,,,,1,0,, itfitstiiitsf SENT σσγγσ +=                  i=1,6;                  
where )(
,1,3,1 itiit FAS −− −  is the error correction term imposing the long-term equilibrium on index i in the 
two markets; itse ,, ( itfe ,, )is the innovation in the spot (futures) market at day t for index i; 
2
,, itsσ =var( itse ,, /Ωt-1,i) is the conditional variance of the spot market and 
2
,, itfσ  =var( itfe ,, /Ωt-1,i) is the 
conditional variance of the futures market, where Ωt,i is the information set available at t for index i. itsf ,,σ   
is the conditional covariance between spot and futures markets. The innovation its ,,ε ( itf ,,ε ) is the 
information from the spot (futures) market which is transmitted to the futures (spot) market and is not 
included in itfe ,, ( itse ,, ). The dummy variable SENT has a value of 1 if sentiment is above the median level 
and 0 otherwise. We use the Sentix 6 month-ESX 50 Index as the sentiment proxy for the European indices 
and AAII for the US index. The dummy variable itsD ,, ( itfD ,, ) is equal to 1 if itse ,,  ( itfe ,, )<0. The dummy 
variable 
0
,, itsD (
0
,, itfD ) is equal to 1 if its ,,ε ( itf ,,ε ) <0. ***, ** and *indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of 
significance, respectively. 
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Table 3. Effect of investor sentiment on spot (futures) volatility (Model 2), on asymmetries in spot 
(futures) volatility (Model 3). on volatility spillovers (Model 4) and on asymmetries in spot (futures) 
volatility spillovers (Model 5). 2001-2011 
 CAC40 DAX30 EUROSTOXX50 FTSE100 IBEX35 S&P500 
Coeff. 
Model 2 
α6 -0.016*** -0.016*** -0.021*** -0.017*** -0.012*** -0.038*** 
β6 -0.015* -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.021*** -0.009*** -0.031*** 
γ1 -0.001*** -0.010*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.002*** -0.009*** 
  Model 3 
α8 -0.190*** -0.044*** -0.027* -0.050*** -0.114*** -0.076*** 
β8 -0.083*** -0.074*** -0.046*** -0.073*** -0.049*** -0.059*** 
γ1 -0.002*** -0.010*** -0.005*** -0.006*** -0.003*** -0.009*** 
  Model 4 
α7 -0.734*** -0.718*** -0.579*** -0.3419*** -1.029*** -0.136*** 
β7 -1.021*** -0.662*** -0.889*** -0.408*** -1.134*** -0.067 
γ1 -0.002*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.007*** -0.002*** -0.008*** 
 Model 5 
α9 0.156 -0.002 -0.034 0.054 -0.042 -0.017*** 
β9 -0.213 -0.005 -0.006 -0.009** 0.107 0.012 
γ1 -0.001*** -0.009*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.001*** -0.008*** 
Unrestricted Model:  
itsitiitiitsiiits eFASARAAR ,,,1,3,1,2,1,,1,0,, )( +−++= −−−  
itfitiitiitfiiitf eFASBRBBR ,,,1,3,1,2,1,,1,0,, )( +−++= −−−  
2
,1,
0
,1,,5
2
,1,,4
2
,1,,1,,3
2
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2
,1,,1,0
2
,, itfitfiitfiitsitsiitsiitsiiits DeDe −−−−−−− +++++= εαεαασααασ  
        
2
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2
,1,,1,,8
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,1,,6 itftitfiitstitsiitftiitsti SENTDeSENTDSENTeSENT −−−−−− ++++ εααεαα  
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,1,,5
2
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2
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2
,1,,2
2
,1,,1,0
2
,, itsitsiitsiitfitfiitfiitfiiitf DeDe −−−−−−− +++++= εβεββσβββσ  
        
2
,1,
0
,1,,9
2
,1,,1,,8
2
,1,,7
2
,1,,6 itstitsiitftitfiitstiitfti SENTDeSENTDSENTeSENT −−−−−− ++++ εββεββ  
;)(
,,,,,1,0,, itfitstiiitsf SENT σσγγσ +=                  i=1,6; 
Model 2: 0
,9,8,7 === iii ααα ; and   0,9,8,7 === iii βββ   
Model 3: 0
,9,7,6 === iii ααα ; and  0,9,7,6 === iii βββ   
Model 4: 0
,9,8,6 === iii ααα ; and  0,9,8,6 === iii βββ   
Model 5: 0
,8,7,6 === iii ααα ; and   0,8,7,6 === iii βββ  
where )(
,1,3,1 itiit FAS −− −   is the error correction term imposing the long-term equilibrium on index i in the 
two markets; itse ,, ( itfe ,, ) is the innovation in the spot (futures) market at day t for index i; 
2
,, itsσ =var( itse ,, /Ωt-1,i) is the conditional variance of the spot market and 
2
,, itfσ  =var( itfe ,, /Ωt-1,i) is the 
conditional variance of the futures market, where Ωt,i is the information set available at t-1 for index i. 
itsf ,,σ   is the conditional covariance between spot and futures markets. The innovation its ,,ε ( itf ,,ε ) is the 
information from the spot (futures) market which is transmitted to the futures (spot) market and is not 
included in itfe ,, ( itse ,, ).The dummy variable SENT has a value of 1 for sentiment scores within the top 25% 
and 0 otherwise. We use the Sentix 6 month-ESX 50 Index as the sentiment proxy for the European indices 
and AAII for the US index. The dummy variable itsD ,, ( itfD ,, ) is equal to 1 if itse ,,  ( itfe ,, )<0. The dummy 
variable 
0
,, itsD (
0
,, itfD ) is equal to 1 if its ,,ε ( itf ,,ε ) <0. ***, ** and *indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of 
significance, respectively.  
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Table 4. Effect of extremely bullish sentiment on correlation between markets and on volatility 
spillovers, Six-month Sentix index and AAII. 2001-2011 
 CAC40 DAX30 EUROSTOXX50 FTSE100 IBEX35 S&P500 
Coeff. 
Model 2 
α6 -0.039*** -0.038*** -0.045*** -0.049*** -0.043*** -0.028*** 
β6 -0.041*** -0.040*** -0.047*** -0.058*** -0.042*** -0.026*** 
γ1 -0.002*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.001** -0.016*** 
  Model 3 
α8 -0.071*** -0.066*** -0.036*** -0.058*** -0.052** -0.076*** 
β8 -0.083*** -0.074*** -0.046*** -0.073*** -0.049*** -0.059*** 
γ1 -0.001*** -0.012*** -0.009*** -0.007*** -0.001 -0.017*** 
  Model 4 
α7 -0.523* -0.606*** -0.528*** -0.342*** -0.956*** 0.088 
β7 -0.074*** -0.636*** -0.920*** -0.376*** -1.162*** 0.077 
γ1 -0.001*** -0.015*** -0.017*** -0.008*** -0.001* -0.013*** 
 Model 5 
α9 -0.363 0.021 -0.041 -0.169* -0.345** -0.019*** 
β9 -0.978 -0.011 -0.016 -0.025*** -0.648*** 0.021 
γ1 -0.001*** -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.007*** 0.000 -0.013*** 
Unrestricted Model:  
itsitiitiitsiiits eFASARAAR ,,,1,3,1,2,1,,1,0,, )( +−++= −−−  
itfitiitiitfiiitf eFASBRBBR ,,,1,3,1,2,1,,1,0,, )( +−++= −−−  
2
,1,
0
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2
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2
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2
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,, itfitfiitfiitsitsiitsiitsiiits DeDe −−−−−−− +++++= εαεαασααασ  
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,, itsitsiitsiitfitfiitfiitfiiitf DeDe −−−−−−− +++++= εβεββσβββσ  
        
2
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0
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,1,,1,,8
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,1,,7
2
,1,,6 itstitsiitftitfiitstiitfti SENTDeSENTDSENTeSENT −−−−−− ++++ εββεββ  
;)(
,,,,,1,0,, itfitstiiitsf SENT σσγγσ +=                  i=1,6; 
Model 2: 0
,9,8,7 === iii ααα ; and   0,9,8,7 === iii βββ  
Model 3: 0
,9,7,6 === iii ααα ; and  0,9,7,6 === iii βββ   
Model 4: 0
,9,8,6 === iii ααα ; and  0,9,8,6 === iii βββ   
Model 5: 0
,8,7,6 === iii ααα ; and   0,8,7,6 === iii βββ  
where )(
,1,3,1 itiit FAS −− −   is the error correction term imposing the long-term equilibrium on index i in the 
two markets; itse ,, ( itfe ,, ) is the innovation in the spot (futures) market at day t for index i; 
2
,, itsσ =var( itse ,, /Ωt-1,i) is the conditional variance of the spot market and 
2
,, itfσ  =var( itfe ,, /Ωt-1,i) is the 
conditional variance of the futures market, where Ωt,i is the information set available at t-1 for index i. 
itsf ,,σ   is the conditional covariance between spot and futures markets. The innovation its ,,ε ( itf ,,ε ) is the 
information from the spot (futures) market which is transmitted to the futures (spot) market and is not 
included in itfe ,, ( itse ,, ).The dummy variable SENT has a value of 1 for sentiment scores within the top 25% 
and 0 otherwise. We use the Sentix 6 month-ESX 50 Index as the sentiment proxy for the European indices 
and AAII for the US index. The dummy variable itsD ,, ( itfD ,, ) is equal to 1 if itse ,,  ( itfe ,, )<0. The dummy 
variable 
0
,, itsD (
0
,, itfD ) is equal to 1 if its ,,ε ( itf ,,ε ) <0. ***, ** and *indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of 
significance, respectively.  
32 
 
Table 5. Effect of sentiment on correlation between markets and on volatility spillovers, One-month Sentix 
index. 2001-2011 
 
 CAC40 DAX30 EUROSTOXX50 FTSE100 IBEX35 
Coeff. 
Model 2 
α6 0.111 -0.007 -0.039*** -0.009* 0.010 
β6 0.119 -0.018*** -0.054*** -0.011** 0.005 
γ1 -0.002*** -0.007*** -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.004*** 
  Model 3 
α8 -0.269*** -0.005 -0.076*** 0.011 0.008 
β8 -0.271*** -0.015 -0.093*** 0.009 0.004 
γ1 -0.003*** -0.007*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.004*** 
  Model 4 
α7 -0.247 -0.647*** -0.090 -0.362*** -1.602*** 
β7 -0.483* -0.758*** -0.273** -0.364*** -1.824*** 
γ1 -0.003*** -0.009*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.005*** 
  Model 5 
α9 -0.096 0.303** 0.084 -0.256*** -0.181*** 
β9 -0.749*** -0.004 -0.018 -0.011** -0.159** 
γ1 -0.003*** -0.007*** -0.010*** -0.011*** -0.004*** 
 
Unrestricted Model:  
itsitiitiitsiiits eFASARAAR ,,,1,3,1,2,1,,1,0,, )( +−++= −−−  
itfitiitiitfiiitf eFASBRBBR ,,,1,3,1,2,1,,1,0,, )( +−++= −−−  
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,,,,,1,0,, itfitstiiitsf SENT σσγγσ +=                  i=1,6; 
Model 2: 0
,9,8,7 === iii ααα ; and   0,9,8,7 === iii βββ  
Model 3: 0
,9,7,6 === iii ααα ; and  0,9,7,6 === iii βββ   
Model 4: 0
,9,8,6 === iii ααα ; and  0,9,8,6 === iii βββ   
Model 5: 0
,8,7,6 === iii ααα ; and   0,8,7,6 === iii βββ  
where )(
,1,3,1 itiit FAS −− −   is the error correction term imposing the long-term equilibrium on index i in 
the two markets; itse ,, ( itfe ,, ) is the innovation in the spot (futures) market at day t for index i; 
2
,, itsσ =var( itse ,, /Ωt-1,i) is the conditional variance of the spot market and 
2
,, itfσ  =var( itfe ,, /Ωt-1,i) is the 
conditional variance of the futures market, where Ωt,i is the information set available at t-1 for index i. 
itsf ,,σ   is the conditional covariance between spot and futures markets. The innovation its ,,ε ( itf ,,ε ) is 
the information from the spot (futures) market which is transmitted to the futures (spot) market and is 
not included in itfe ,, ( itse ,, ).The dummy variable SENT has a value of 1 if sentiment is above the median 
level and 0 otherwise. We use the Sentix 1 month-ESX 50 Index as the sentiment proxy for the European 
indices. The dummy variable itsD ,, ( itfD ,, ) is equal to 1 if itse ,,  ( itfe ,, )<0. The dummy variable 
0
,, itsD (
0
,, itfD ) is equal to 1 if its ,,ε ( itf ,,ε ) <0. ***, ** and *indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of 
significance, respectively.  
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Table 6. Effect of sentiment on correlation between markets and on volatility spillovers, 2003-2007 
 
 CAC40 DAX30 EUROSTOXX50 FTSE100 IBEX35 S&P500 
Coeff. 
 Model 2 
α6 0.010 -0.017* -0.021** -0.023** -0.017 -0.018* 
β6 0.005 -0.022*** -0.035*** -0.024** -0.026 -0.021* 
γ1 -0.002*** -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.003*** -0.001 -0.004*** 
   Model 3 
α8 -0.153*** -0.044** -0.030* -0.023** -0.109*** -0.063*** 
β8 -0.169*** -0.049*** -0.047** -0.024** -0.116*** -0.060*** 
γ1 -0.004*** -0.013*** -0.008** -0.003*** -0.001* -0.006*** 
   Model 4 
α7 -1.081*** -0.589*** -0.030 -0.491** .0.262 0.118 
β7 -1.357*** -0.639*** -0.239** -0.362* -0.623 0.109 
γ1 -0.003*** -0.017*** -0.008** -0.004** -0.001 -0.004** 
   Model 5 
α9 -0.253 0.040 0.142 -0.211 0.030 0.079 
β9 -0.834*** -0.004 -0.019 -0.008 -0.009 -0.001 
γ1 -0.002*** -0.009*** -0.003 -0.002** -0.001 -0.004*** 
Unrestricted Model:  
itsitiitiitsiiits eFASARAAR ,,,1,3,1,2,1,,1,0,, )( +−++= −−−  
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,1,,6 itstitsiitftitfiitstiitfti SENTDeSENTDSENTeSENT −−−−−− ++++ εββεββ  
;)(
,,,,,1,0,, itfitstiiitsf SENT σσγγσ +=                  i=1,6; 
Model 2: 0
,9,8,7 === iii ααα ; and   0,9,8,7 === iii βββ  
Model 3: 0
,9,7,6 === iii ααα ; and  0,9,7,6 === iii βββ   
Model 4: 0
,9,8,6 === iii ααα ; and  0,9,8,6 === iii βββ   
Model 5: 0
,8,7,6 === iii ααα ; and   0,8,7,6 === iii βββ  
where )(
,1,3,1 itiit FAS −− −   is the error correction term imposing the long-term equilibrium on index i in the 
two markets; itse ,, ( itfe ,, ) is the innovation in the spot (futures) market at day t for index i; 
2
,, itsσ =var( itse ,, /Ωt-1,i) is the conditional variance of the spot market and 
2
,, itfσ  =var( itfe ,, /Ωt-1,i) is the 
conditional variance of the futures market, where Ωt,i is the information set available at t-1 for index i. 
itsf ,,σ   is the conditional covariance between spot and futures markets. The innovation its ,,ε ( itf ,,ε ) is the 
information from the spot (futures) market which is transmitted to the futures (spot) market and is not 
included in itfe ,, ( itse ,, ).The dummy variable SENT has a value of 1 for sentiment scores within the top 25% 
and 0 otherwise. We use the Sentix 6 month-ESX 50 Index as the sentiment proxy for the European indices 
and AAII for the US index. The dummy variable itsD ,, ( itfD ,, ) is equal to 1 if itse ,,  ( itfe ,, )<0. The dummy 
variable 
0
,, itsD (
0
,, itfD ) is equal to 1 if its ,,ε ( itf ,,ε ) <0. ***, ** and *indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% levels of 
significance, respectively.  
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Table 7. Effect of sentiment on hedging using futures contracts. (RVar) 
 
CAC DAX Eurstoxx FTSE Ibex35 S&P500 
TC=0 
Naïve 3.43% 1.66% 8.07% 0.84% 14.56% 1.43% 
h constant 2.97% 0.83% 1.50% 0.55% 11.59% 0.48% 
ht without sent 0.03% 0.67% 0.09% 0.05% 0.77% 0.07% 
RIS 1.01% 80.72% 6.00% 9.09% 6.64% 14.38% 
TC=0.03% 
Naïve 1.13% 0.47% 8.59% 0.65% 9.66% 0.72% 
h constant 0.65% 0.37% 2.05% 0.37% 6.25% 0.24% 
ht without sent 0.02% 0.22% 0.46% 0.34% 1.49% 0.03% 
RIS 57.52% 78.72% 23.86% 56.92% 64.70% 33.33.% 
Percentage reduction in the variance ( xRVar ) of the benchmark hedged position using 
Sent
th  relative to that 
obtained using the ratio X ( OSentth , h and 1). )(
)()(
b
H
b
H
x
H
x
RVar
RVarRVarRVar −=  where )( xHRVar  is the variance of the 
hedged position using the hedge ratio X ( OSentth , h and 1)) and )( bHRVar  is the variance of the hedged position 
using the dynamic hedge ratio obtained from Model 1 ( Sentth ) , the model taken as the benchmark for this 
analysis. The Naïve model assumes a hedge ratio of unity. The constant h model calculates it as unconditional 
variance over spot and futures returns and the unconditional variance of the futures returns market. The 
OSent
th  is identical to Sentth except that it does not include sentiment in the conditional covariance equation.  RIS 
is the percentage reduction in variance that occurs when sentiment is included in the dynamic hedging 
strategy (using Sentth  instead of OSentth , that is, OS
th
RVar ) with respect to that obtained using  the constant ratio 
(using Sentth  instead of h , that is, hRVar ) 
h
h
RVar
RVar
RIS
OSent
t
= . TC is the percentage of transaction cost in relation 
to the value of the hedging operation. 
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Table 8. Effect of sentiment on futures mispricing. Relative absolute spread ( tjM , ) 
  CAC Dax Eurostoxx FTSE Ibex US 
HSent(%) 0.113 0.171 0.2126 0.1451 0.1285 0.142 
LSent (%) 0.1121 0.1756 0.2129 0.1468 0.1295 0.142 
H-L Misp Ratio 0.9916 1.0269 1.0013 1.0123 1.0072 0.9999 
p-value1 0.8627 0.6611 0.5727 0.7808 0.8468 0.9991 
MSent (%) 0.109 0.17 0.222 0.155 0.114 0.135 
H&LSent (%) 0.12 0.171 0.228 0.158 0.119 0.149 
H&L-M Misp Ratio 1.1027 1.0026 1.0268 1.0134 1.0502 1.1007 
p-value2 0.053 0.9541 0.5606 0.7599 0.0967 0.0138 
HSent(%) is the average level of mispricing in futures contracts during high sentiment periods, in 
percentage terms. LSent (%) is the same for low sentiment periods.  High/low sentiment is determined 
as a function of the level of sentiment in relation to the median of the series. The H-L Misp Ratio is the 
ratio of mispricing in high sentiment periods to mispricing in low sentiment periods. p-value1 is the 
level of significance of the null hypothesis that the H-L Misp Ratio  is equal to 1. MSent(%) is the mean 
level of mispricing in futures contracts in moderate sentiment periods, in percentage terms. H&LSent 
(%) is the same for extreme (high or low) sentiment periods. In the last two cases, High/Low sentiment 
is when it is above/below the 75th/25th percentiles of the series. Sentiment is considered to be moderate 
if it is between the 25th and 75th percentiles. The mispricing of futures on index j at time t tjM ,  is 
computed as the relative absolute spread between actual futures market prices tjF ,  and our theoretical 
cost-of-carry valuation CCtjF , , CC
tj
CC
tjtj
tj F
FF
M
,
,,
,
−
=  . The H&L-M Misp Ratio is the ratio of mispricing in 
extreme (high and low) sentiment periods to mispricing in moderate sentiment periods.  p-value 2 is 
the level of significance of the null hypothesis that the H&L-M Misp Ratio  is equal to 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
